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Case Comment
RE VANTEL BROADCASTING CO.-ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-REVIEW OF
FEDERAL TRIBUNALS - MULTIPLE JURISDICTION - The recent decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Re Vantel Broadcasting
Co.., once again raises a problem that hitherto has gone without an
entirely satisfactory solution-that is, whether or not a provincial
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the acts of a federal admini-
strative agency. The problem has been recently dealt with by
Professor H. W. Arthurs2 which was written a few months prior to
the British Columbia court's decision. Thus, this note becomes a
sequel with, of course, the added benefit of the Court of Appeal
decision in Vantel.
The facts of the VanteZ case lend themselves to a neat, simplified
statement of the problem. Vantel Broadcasting Co. carried on a
broadcasting business in British Columbia and all of Vantel's em-
ployees were resident in British Columbia. The Canada Labour
Relations Board, a federal administrative agency with its head
office in Ottawa, Ontario, issued three certificates, each certifying
a union to be the bargaining agent for a group of employees of
Vantel. Vantel Broadcasting Co. then applied to the Supreme Court
of British Columbia for a writ of certiorari to bring up and quash
the three certificates. The writ was refused on a preliminary objec-
tion taken by counsel for the Board-that the Supreme Court of
British Columbia had no authority over a Federal Board located
in the Province of Ontario. On an appeal from this decision to
the B.C. Court of Appeal consisting of five judges, the appeal was
allowed in a unanimous decision. Sheppard J.A., concurred in by
three of the other sitting judges,3 held that since the matter affected
the rights of people only in British Columbia:
the matter would be a matter within the administration of justice
within the province and within the jurisdiction of the court as conferred
by the Legislature under 92(14).4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal reversed
the judgment of Brown, J.5 who had relied on two earlier decisions 6
which had held in effect that since the Supreme Court could not
enforce its writ of certiorari against a Federal Board, outside the
province, then it should and would decline jurisdiction. This, then,
was an applicttion of "the personal amenability to process" test.
I Re Vantel Broadcasting Co. Ltd., and Canada Labour Relations Board
et al. (1962) 35 D.L.R. (2d) 620. The problem was possibly first perceived by
Cameron C.J.C.P. in Re Bell Telephone Co., (1885) 9 O.R. 339 at 346 when
he said "... it can hardly be said that Provincial Courts created by local
legislatures have inherently power to reverse the decisions of Courts created
by the Parliament of the Dominion. To so determine, however is not essential
to this application and I do not therefore intend to decide it."
2 (1962) 39 C.B.R. 505.
3 Bird, Norris, Wilson JJ.A. Both Norris J.A. and Wilson J.A. gave their
own reasons in addition.
4 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 635.
5 (1961) 37 W.W.R. 345 (B.C.S.C.).
6 MoGuire v. McGuire and Desordi [1953] O.R. 328. In re Bence (1955)
22 C.P.R. 1 this latter case was decided by Davey J.
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For example, in the Bence decision,7 the British Columbia Supreme
Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition against the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission, on the ground that, though they were
conducting hearings in B.C., they were not amenable to the B.C.
court because they had adjourned to Ottawa to deliberate.
In refuting the Board's argument that the court should decline
jurisdiction because of the extra-provincial unenforceability Davey
J.A. said:
It is unthinkable that the Dominion Government would tolerate one
of its Board's disobeying an order of a provincial court.8
He went on to say:
The truth of the matter is that the effectiveness of judgments and
orders of the Courts against Governments and Government Boards
depends on the traditional respect that the Governments pay to the
Courts and not upon legal sanctions for disobedience.9
In dealing with the same argument, Sheppard J.A. began by
distinguishing the issue of the jurisdiction of a provincial court from
the altogether different issue of the extra-territorial enforcement of
a judgment and then continued:
. . . a judgment thus obtained in respect of a breach of a contract
wherever made - committed in the province may not be recognized
extra-provincially, but that does not prevent the Court from assuming
jurisdiction. In any event, those cases enunciating the rule for enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment have no application to the case at bar as
no other province will be asked to enforce the order for certiorari In
that the rights of the applicant that are to be protected and the infringe-
ment thereof are wholly within the Province of British Columbia.10
When the facts of the Vantel case are borne in mind, it is
evident that this was a fair and equitable result, for the certificates
were granted to local unions within the province of British Columbia,
affecting employees and an employer within the province and the
contracts of employment were to be performed entirely within the
province.
However, because this case was comparatively uncomplicated,
all the rights concerned being confined to British Columbia, both
Sheppard J.A. and Davey J.A. were able to confine their remarks
to the particular facts of the case. By confining their judgments,
certain practical questions were raised and left unanswered. For
example, Davey J.A. speaks of reluctance of the Dominion Govern-
ment to allow a Federal Board to disobey an order of a provincial
court. What would be the result if there were two conflicting
decisions of two different provincial courts on the same issue? Which
order would the Dominion Government "allow" its Board to obey?
In addition, Sheppard J.A. indicated in the Vantel case that no other
provincial court will be asked to enforce the order of certiorari
7 Ibid.





issued because the rights of the applicant and the infringement of
those rights took place entirely within British Columbia. Again,
what would the result be if there were rights and an infringement
of those rights in more than one province?
An example may serve to bring these questions into focus more
clearly. Suppose that rather than being a local broadcasting company
Vantel were instead a national, privately owned television network
with employees in each of the ten provinces. Assume also that the
Canada Labour Relations Board had issued a certificate certifying
a union as the bargaining agent for a group of employees in each
of the provinces. Lastly, assume that the company sought to quash
these proceedings. On the basis of the VanteZ decision, the company
could bring proceedings in any one of the ten provinces in the
Dominion. This follows from the fact that the matter would be in
relation to rights of employers and employees within each province
and with regard to contracts of employment, to be performed entirely
within the province and therefore would be administration of justice
within the province.'
Carrying the hypothetical example further, suppose that the
company brought proceedings in B.C. and that court refused to issue
a writ of certiorari. Following this, suppose the company applied
in the Ontario court for the same writ We have now arrived at the
question left open by Sheppard J.A.-namely, must the Ontario
court recognize the order of the B.C. court or can it hear the appli-
cation on its merits? Here we do have a situation where another
province will be asked to enforce this order of the B.C. court since
the rights and infringement of those rights arise in another prov-
ince.12 Must the Ontario court now enforce it? An answer to this
dilemma was provided by the Fish Inquiry litigation'3 that imme-
diately preceded the Vante case. There, the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission was investigating an alleged conspiracy to
enhance the price of raw fish in British Columbia. A question arose
as to the propriety of disclosure of certain evidence by the Chairman
of the Commission. This disclosure was contested by the parties
to the investigation and an injunction was sought, but the B.C.
court refused to grant it. However, in subsequent proceedings in
the Ontario court, the injunction was granted.14 Both courts assumed
jurisdiction on the basis that the Board was amenable to its juris-
diction; the B.C. court because the Board was conducting its hearings
in B.C. and the Ontario court because the Board's base of operation
was Ottawa, Ontario. In the Ontario decision, the court did not
11 Supra, footnote 4.
32 Supra, footnote 10.
3 Canadian Fishing Co. Ltd. et aZ v. Smith et aZ (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d)
41 (B.C.S.C.).
14 British Columbia Packers Ltd. et al v. Smith, MacDonald and A.G. of
Canada (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d) 711 (O.I-.C.).
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refer at all to the prior B.C. decision. 15 Thus it appears that one
provincial court will not be bound and need not enforce the decision
of another provincial court in matters pertaining to prerogative writs.
Assuming that the courts in the hypothetical case would come to
different conclusions, reference should now be made to the comments
of Davey J.A.16 where he suggests that the Dominion Government
would be reluctant to allow a Federal Board to disobey an order
of a provincial court. Obviously these remarks do not fit the hypo-
thetical case as there would be two decisions involving the Board
on identical issues. What would the Board do with these decisions?
Which one must it obey in deference to the other? It is clear then
that the personal amenability test, or the "administration of Justice"
test of Sheppard J.A.17 present two serious difficulties. Firstly, they
give a very unsatisfactory test for jurisdiction in these matters and
afford an opportunity for a "shopping plaintiff."' 8 From the stand-
point of uniformity and stability alone, this is a wholly unhealthy
situation. Citizens involved in these proceedings "are entitled to
protection effective not merely within a province but throughout
the Dominion.' 9 But how is one to obtain this protection if ten
different courts have the jurisdiction to hear the same matter?
Secondly, and more obvious is the practical matter of the conflicting
decisions themselves. As suggested previously, this presents an
irreconcilable problem to any Federal Board. It should obey the
decisions of the provincial courts, but which one is it to obey?
Assuming these decisions to be constitutionally correct; what
then is the solution to this unsatisfactory state of affairs? One
solution was suggested by Davey J.A. in the closing line of his
judgment when he said that each court should pay respect to the
other court's orders.20 Perhaps this should have been followed in
the Fishing litigation, the Ontario court respecting the B.C. order.
However, is this a fair result where the parties affected are also in
Ontario? Why should the B.C. court have the right to determine
the question merely because it was the first court to hear the
proceedings? (It seems also that this is an unsatisfactory test
because it will lead to confusion as to the exact "considerations"
the court is to balance.)
15 In interlocutory proceedings in Ontario, Aylen J. (1959) 22 D.L.R. (2d)
156 at p. 160, expressed his doubts as to the Ontario Court having jurisdiction
but this was not mentioned in the trial decisions.
16 Supra, footnote 8.
-7 Supra, footnote 10.
'8 Supra, footnote 2 at p. 506.
'9 Supra, footnote 2 at p. 509.20 Supra, footnote 1 at 632 Davey J.A. said "When a Dominion Board ...
is dealing with affairs extending over provincial boundaries several provincial
courts may have jurisdiction over it through prerogative writs. In such a
case each court should pay respect to the others and decide on a balance of
consideration whether it ought to exercise jurisdiction or leave the matter
to one of the other courts."
[VOL. 2:508518
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Professor Arthurs suggests an alternative solution to the mul-
tiple jurisdiction problem:
To ask whether the federal official is personally amenable to the pro-
vincial process is to mis-state the issue. The true question is: "What
forum could most appropriately adjudicate litigation arising out of the
federal administrative process? 21
It is obvious that a more practical solution would be to confer
jurisdiction on one court whose decisions would be final and binding
throughout Canada. Professor Arthurs went on to conclude that
the Exchequer Court would be the most "appropriate forum" to
review federal administrative action and suggested that the Ex-
chequer Court Act be amended accordingly. The difficulty of accessi-
bility to the Exchequer Court that exists in provinces other than
Ontario could be solved by appointing a local Judge of the Provincial
Supreme Court concerned to hear the proceedings in relation to
the prerogative writs as is done in Admiralty22 and Bankruptcy
proceedings.P
This suggestion is a meritorious one in that it solves the two-
fold problem presented by the "personal amenability" or "administra-
tion of justice" tests. It would reserve jurisdiction in these matters
in the Exchequer Court exclusively. Its decision would be final and
binding throughout Canada, except for an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada. (This would solve the embarrassing decisions
that heretofore have been rendered.) It would avoid also the em-
barrassment of conflicting decisions and fix on the Board one decision
to follow.
However, there are difficulties in extending the jurisdiction of
the Exchequer Court. The most obvious and most practical problem
is of the inaccessibility of the Exchequer Court to those provinces
outside Ontario. As suggested previously, this problem could be met
by the appointment of a local Judge of the Supreme Court of the
Province as the Exchequer Court Judge.
It has been suggested also, that the extension of the jurisdiction
of the Exchequer Court would lead to specialization of the court
system and procedure. This problem, however, could be solved by
simply adopting the provincial court rules pertaining to prerogative
writ proceedings in the new court. These proceedings are not as
complex as Admiralty or Bankruptcy proceedings and would not
require their own procedure.
Another argument raised against the extension is that because
the Supreme Court of Canada can finally determine these disputes
there really is never any actual problem of conflicting decision. But
this ignores the need for the prompt and expeditious disposition of
21 Supra, footnote 2 at p. 509.22 R.S.C. 1952 c. 1.
23 R.S.C. 1952 c. 14.
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matters of utmost importance in such fields as Labour Relations and
Immigration Proceedings. In addition, appeals to the Supreme Court
of Canada involve considerable additional expense to the parties con-
cerned.
Finally, it is suggested that the extension of the jurisdiction
of the Exchequer Court would tend to multiply and duplicate the
jurisdiction, exactly what the British North America Act sought to
avoid. This theory of a simplified court structure is a sound and
enviable one and should not be destroyed. However, in 1867 the
economic machinery was much less complex than it is today. It is to
cope with this complexity that the federal government has seen fit to
create the many tribunals and administrative agencies which exist
today. If our complicated economy requires a minor duplication
of courts to cope with its problems, then the advantages of their
duplication far outweighs the disadvantages. It is submitted then,
that the present system although it may be constitutionally 24 valid,
it does not afford the uniform protection required.
PETER CATHCARTO
CANADA TRUST v. LABADIE--GIFTS---DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA-STATE
OF M1MN OF DONER-Upon first reading, Canada Trust Co., v., babadiel
a recent decisiorl of the Ontario Court of Appeal, seems to depart
from the general principles of the law of valid donatio mortis causa
as laid down in their classic form in Cain v. Moon.2 Specifically,
this impression is created by Mr. Justice Roach's statement that:
It is impossible on the evidence to hold that at the various times when he
delivered possession to the respondent he was by reason of his then
physical condition, and the surrounding circumstances, in extremis.
Such a condition is an essential to a valid donatio mortis causa... 3
The classic statement of Lord Russell in Cain v. Moon is as
follows:
It is further conceded that for an effectual donatio mortis causa three
things must combine: first, the gift or donation must have been made in
contemplation, though not necessarily in expectation, of death; secondly,
there must have been delivery to the donee of the subject-matter of the
gift; and thirdly, the gift must be made under such circumstances as
show that the thing is to revert to the donor in case he should
recover.4
2 4 0ne additional problem that arises out of the Vantel decision, is that
once assuming the jurisdictional procedure problem, by what means Is the
court to determine whether or not the Board has acted fairly? In other
words, since the provincial court has assumed jurisdiction, does it follow
that it can then proceed to apply its own substantive rule of natural justice?
It may be that with the enactment of the federal Bill of Rights, the provincial
court should apply it to the question of whether the court has acted fairly,
which of course is the essential nature of prerogative remedies. On the other
hand, there may not be any practical difference at all as to which rule the
court applies.
*MAr. Cathcart is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1962] O.R. 151; 31 D.L.R. (2d) 252.
2 [1896] 2 Q.B. 283.
3 Supra, footnote (1) at 152; 253.
4 Supra, footnote (2) at 286.
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